Advanced Journal of Management, Humanity and Social Science

Abstract Economic sanctions are an increasingly central instrument of statecraft. Their proliferation since the early 2000s — and particularly after 2014 and 2022 in response to high-profile geopolitical events — has created complex tensions between public international law, domestic sanctions regimes, and the private-law regime of international arbitration. This article analyzes how sanctions shape (1) the jurisdictional and arbitrability questions tribunals face, (2) procedural conduct and due process in arbitration, and (3) the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in domestic courts. First, the paper maps the legal architecture: the New York Convention, ICSID framework, UNCITRAL rules, domestic sanctions regimes (notably U.S. OFAC and EU restrictive measures) and counter-measures such as EU blocking statutes. Second, it examines doctrinal fault lines — choice of law, public policy defenses, supervening impossibility/frustration, and state immunity — and how tribunals and courts have addressed them. Third, it surveys practical impediments: asset freezes that render awards effectively unenforceable, restrictions on counsel/arbitrators caused by sanctions, seat selection and institutional compliance, and the chilling effect on dispute settlement. The analysis integrates recent scholarship and institutional guidance to show that (a) sanctions often convert solvable contractual disputes into multi-jurisdictional legal puzzles; (b) tribunals retain procedural and substantive tools to manage sanctions-related disputes but their remedies are uneven; and (c) enforcement of awards is increasingly contestable where sanctions and sovereign immunity intersect. The paper concludes with recommendations: refined drafting (sanctions clauses, payment/escrow mechanisms), tribunal powers to order interim relief cognizant of sanctions law, coordinated institutional guidance, and diplomatic-legal responses (blocking statutes, targeted licenses) to protect the effectiveness of international arbitration without undermining legitimate sanctions policy.

Abstract This article examines the principal legal, constitutional and practical obstacles to recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the Islamic Republic of Iran, focusing on the twin concepts of public order (ordre public) and national sovereignty. Iran’s accession to the 1958 New York Convention in 2001 and the enactment of domestic arbitration legislation modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law have, in principle, created a framework conducive to enforcement; however, constitutional constraints, state practice and policy considerations repeatedly complicate implementation. Central among obstacles is Article 139 of the Iranian Constitution, which conditions referral or settlement of disputes concerning public or state property to the approval of the Council of Ministers and—where foreigners are parties—to parliamentary notification or approval, thereby limiting the arbitrability and enforceability of awards touching on public/state assets. Courts applying the public-order exception under the New York Convention and domestic procedural rules have at times invoked Article 139 or broad public policy concerns to deny recognition or to delay enforcement; recent jurisprudence from Iran’s Supreme Court (2024) evidences incremental clarification but does not eliminate uncertainty. Other enforcement hurdles include ambiguities in statutory definitions (e.g., what counts as “international” or “public” property), procedural barriers (jurisdictional review, limited discovery, availability of interim measures), state immunity claims, and the impact of extrajudicial factors such as international sanctions and political relations. The article analyses doctrinal debates, major statutory provisions, representative case law and evolving administrative practice, and proposes targeted reforms—statutory clarifications, issuance of implementing regulations, internal approval protocols for Article 139 matters, judicial training, and treaty-level initiatives—to reconcile Iran’s commitment to arbitral enforcement with legitimate public-order and sovereignty concerns while improving predictability for foreign investors and creditors.