Attacks on critical infrastructure, whether kinetic or cyber, constitute one of the most pressing challenges in contemporary international law. The 2026 joint military strikes by the United States and Israel against Iran's nuclear facilities, energy infrastructure, bridges, and transportation networks, combined with concurrent cyber operations targeting communication systems, have reignited debate over the legal framework governing such attacks. This article examines the legal dimensions of the prohibition on infrastructure attacks under international law, analyzing the US-Israel strikes as a case study and exploring available legal avenues for Iran to seek recourse before international judicial bodies. Using a descriptive-analytical methodology grounded in treaty interpretation, customary international law analysis, and judicial precedent, this research finds that while international humanitarian law (IHL) provides a robust framework through the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, the concept of "dual-use" objects—objects with both civilian and military applications—creates significant interpretive ambiguity . Despite this ambiguity, Article 56 of Additional Protocol I explicitly protects nuclear power plants from attack where such attacks may cause dangerous force release, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) has established precedent by issuing arrest warrants for attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure. The research identifies four principal legal avenues: proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), prosecution before the ICC, arbitration through bilateral dispute resolution mechanisms, and domestic litigation. However, significant obstacles persist, including the United States' withdrawal from the 1955 Treaty of Amity with Iran, non-membership in the Rome Statute, attribution challenges for cyber operations, and evidentiary difficulties. The article concludes that while international law prohibits attacks on critical infrastructure, enforcement mechanisms remain inadequate, and the most effective long-term strategy involves strengthening multilateral cooperation and developing a dedicated convention on critical infrastructure protection.